



Left Wing Extremism

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Telangana Success Story

Phase I: Naxalite Entry (1967–1977)

1967 Naxalbari uprising inspired armed struggle nationwide

- APCCCR (Andhra Pradesh Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries) formed in 1968 under Tarimela Nagi Reddy
- CPI (ML) formed in 1969 advocating armed revolution
- North Telangana emerged as a receptive region
- Severe repression during Emergency (1975–77)

Phase II: Regrouping & Mass Base (1977–1980)


Post-Emergency tactical withdrawal from armed struggle

- Launch of 'Go to Village Campaign' (1978–84)
- Mobilisation of students, youth, peasants
- Over 2,400 villages covered in North Telangana
- Popular peasant movements Eg: Jagityala Jaitra Yatra – 09.09.1978
- Prepared ground for sustained armed movement

Jagityala Jaitra Yatra 09.09.1978



Reasons for uprising of extremism in TG



Phase III: People's War Group Era (1980–2004)

CPI (ML) People's War Group (PWG) formed on 22 April 1980

- Telangana became core Maoist operational zone
- Guerrilla warfare, ambushes, Jan Adalats, extortion
- Major ambushes in late 1980s and 1990s
- Daragadda (East Godavari) & Allampalli (Adilabad) ambushes -1987
- Greyhounds force raised in 1989 - Police modernization and intelligence-led operations
- PWG faced increasing losses after mid-1990s
- August 1998, CPI (ML) (PWG) merged with CPI (ML) (Party Unity) - formed CPI (ML) People's War.
- Formation of People's Guerrilla Army (2000)

Phase IV: CPI (Maoist) & Decline (2005–2014)

PWG merged with MCC to form CPI (Maoist) in 2004

- Peace talks failed in 2005
- Leadership neutralised; large-scale surrenders
- Loss of mass base and village control in Telangana
- Maoists pushed towards border forest regions


Phase V: Post-Telangana State (2014–Present)

Formation of Telangana state in 2014


- Maoist presence limited to TS–Chhattisgarh border pockets
- No guerrilla zones or mass mobilisation
- Focus on prevention, development, and tribal welfare

MAOIST ORGANISATION - Understanding the Enemy

Maoist Organization:



Organizational Structure



Understanding the Enemy....

Maoist Organization: (initial Phases)

Political Strategy

- Protracted People's War (PPW).
- Always keep the public on their side.
- Deep understanding about people, terrain and enemy (Security Forces).
- Reliance on building mass movements on local issues.
- Deter investment and development in interior areas.
- Systematic neutralization of administrative machinery.
- Discredit Government Machinery & foment disaffection.
- Aspire to build Mass militia bases to revolt against legitimate governments.

Understanding the Enemy....

Maoist Organization:

Military Strategy

- Guerilla Tactics – small teams – Hit and Run - Secretive
- Build widespread militia network with revolutionary ideology
- Selective annihilation of class enemies mostly feudal landlords to begin with to win the public confidence
- Demonstrative actions of violence to keep the people under check
- Attacks on security forces and public representatives to create administrative vacuum at the field level
- Systematic destruction of police informant network

Initial police response - Bitter Experiences

Initial police response

- No centralised strategy.
- AOPs without proper orientation.
- Mass raids and Cordon & search ops (CaSO).
- Action on militants & sympathizers.
- Resulted in police excesses - more recruitment.

Bitter experiences

- Brutal killings of innocent villagers branding as informants.
- Abduction of political & official functionaries.
- Rampant extortions at gun point.
- Indiscriminate explosion of landmines.
- Attacks on PSs killing unwary policemen and looting fire-arms.
- Carrying out routine police functions became difficult.
- Laid ambushes on security forces and inflicted heavy losses in TG.
 - 2182 civilians and 326 police personnel since 1968
 - Killed a total of 371 political activists of different parties.
 - Attacked PSs on 73 occasions killing 74 police personnel.
 - Exploded landmines on 96 occasions killing 184 police personnel.

Challenges - Police preparedness (since 90's)


Challenges encountered by State

- Unconventional war
- Guerrilla tactics
- Ambushes
- Predominant use of IEDs
- Pressure tactics (Abductions)
- Hostile public

Police preparedness

- Unprepared/untrained police
- Inadequate manpower
- Poor intelligence network
- Lack of infrastructure
- Primitive weaponry
- Inconsistent policies

State Strategy evolved over a period (since phase II)



Multi-Pronged Strategy (of AP/TG)

Key Elements:

- Socio-economic development of interior/in-accessible areas.
- Eliminating/minimizing collateral damage.
- Winning the hearts and minds of public.
- Engaging the misguided youth in constructive activities.
- Empowerment of Police Forces with additional manpower, mobility, infrastructure, technology and capacity building.
- Confidence building measures among all stake holders.
- Public Perception Management (Psy-ops).

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Security Related Measures (of AP/TG)

Building Institutions at all levels

State Level:

- Greyhounds – elite Commando Force – Built on guerilla tactics (1989)
- Special Intelligence Branch (SIB) – Exclusively for LWE (1990)
- Intelligence Security Wing (ISW) – VIP Security (1985)

District Level:

- Addl. SP (Operations) or Officer on Special Duty (OSD)
- District Guards – Built on guerilla tactics
- Counter Action Teams (CATs)
- Naxal Information Bureau (NIB)
- Kalabrindalu for counter propaganda
- District Security Wing

PS Level:

- Intelligence collection team
- Database on militants, sympathizers and open activists
- Maintaining Records of day-to-day movements of squads shelters, hideouts, camping sites of extremists, etc.

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Security Related Measures (of AP/TG)

Capacity building at all levels of Police

Infrastructure:

- Attack-proof buildings for police stations, offices at circle level, sub-divisional level and district level
- Commando Training Centers at State and District levels
- Raising TSSP Bns and IR Bns

Training:

- Imparting Jungle Warfare and Counter Guerilla operations training to all the officers and men (PCs to AsSP) at the time of induction
- Periodical refresher courses for officers at all levels
- Understanding of Revolutionary Ideologies and their tactics

Placement Policy:

- Posting of young and dynamic officers in all affected areas

Location of PS in open areas (unified Warangal district)



Pucca PS building – Circular model (Kataram PS)



Commando Training by Grey Hounds



Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Security Related Measures (of AP/TG)

Strategy/Tactics adopted by Police

Responsibility of Local PS/SHO

- Ownership to the local police in handling the prevailing situation
- Neutralizing the militia network
- Legal action against sympathizers and small-time activists
- Community Policing for winning hearts and minds of the local population

Responsibility of District SP/District Guards/ Greyhounds

- Focus on neutralizing armed formations through Human Intelligence

Responsibility of SIB

- Policy making
- Neutralizing the Top leadership
- Intelligence based operations
- Neutralising supply and logistic network
- Neutralising Front Organisations

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Administrative Measures (of AP/TG)

- Banning CPI (Maoist) and its front organizations under TSPS Act - 1992.
- Victim reassurance packages for victims of extremist violence.
 - Police
 - Political executives
 - Civilians
- Comprehensive rehabilitation policy for surrendered extremists - 1993.

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Administrative Measures... (of AP/TG)

- Accelerated promotions
- Incentive cash rewards for apprehension of underground Maoists
- Appointment of civilians as Police constables who provide good information leading to neutralization of cadre by relaxing certain guidelines.
- Incentives for the officers and men showing high initiative in anti-extremist field like
 - 1) Accelerated promotions
 - 2) Gallantry medals
 - 3) State medals
 - 4) Choice Postings for good LWE work
 - 5) Cash rewards

Multi-Pronged Strategy... (of AP/TG)

Confidence Building Measures among Police/Families

- Construction of residential quarters for officers and men within the premises of police station.
- Providing secured accommodation for targeted police officers.
- Adequate security to targeted officers depending upon the threat, even after retirement.
- Equipped with sophisticated weaponry, advanced technology and communication systems.
- Enhanced the skills of Police at all levels.

Understanding the Enemy....

Welfare Measures for Police

Benefits for the spouses/children of the personnel killed in extremist violence:

1. Employment.
2. Payment of salary till the date of superannuation.
3. Immediate Payment of ex-gratia to the kith and kin.
4. House sites & travel concession.
5. Free Education to the children.
6. Reservation quota in Medical (0.25%)/Engineering Seats (2%).

Multi-Pronged Strategy... (of AP/TG)

Development & Welfare Programs

- Opening all inaccessible areas through extensive road network.
- Establishment of ITDAs since 80's.
- Skill Development of Youth and large-scale recruitment.
- Employment Generation Programs.
- Expansion of Communication Network.
- Improving Health and Education infrastructure
- Drinking water and Irrigation
- Large scale welfare measures

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Final Outcome post Telangana formation

- Top leadership of Maoists at State level neutralised including arrests, surrenders and deaths. 1673 UG cadres in 1998; 17 as on date.
- Increase in the surrenders with weapons
 - 2021- 98 increased to 2025 - **527** (02-CCMs, 11-SCMs, 20-DVCMs, 57-ACMs, 121-PMs).
 - 2026- **22** (02-SCMs, 03-DVCM, 07-ACM, 10-PM).
- Firearms surrendered in 2025-26:
 - 2014-21 - **148**, 2025-26 - **81** firearms & **3283** Ammunition.
(LMG – 03, AK47 – 12, Tavor – 01, Colt – 01, SLR – 15, INSAS – 17)

Multi-Pronged Strategy...

Outcome upto 2006.

- Neutralised armed dalams at a rapid pace.
- Neutralized the militia network.
- Strengthened informant network.
- Adopting latest technologies to develop intelligence.
- Dominated the strong holds & base areas of Maoists.
- Public support to Maoists receded.
- Zero recruitment.
- **Finally, the Maoists vacated the State in 2006 & shifted their base to CG.**

Latest Strategy by Union Govt – TG response...

28

- Operation Samadan
- Operation Prahar
- Operation Kaghar
- Elimination of Maoism by March 2026 is the objective
- Increased military cover (200+ FoBs in CG – 1 lakh paramilitary force)
- Increased Military activities

Note: TG's response has been a delicate balance between all out policy of Union Govt and balance approach of Telangana.

Results of TG's approach



41 Cadres surrendered before the DGP on 19.12.2025

Results of TG's approach



Badse Deva
Bn Cmdr



Badse Deva
Bn Cmdr

Venkatesh
SCM

Front Organisations of CPI (Maoist) – Role in LWE

- The strength of the Maoist party is strong mass base.
- Front organizations of CPI (Maoist) are working under the guidance of concerned State Committees and Central Committees.
- More than 50% of the party leadership previously worked and came from Front organizations
- Maoist party allots budget Rs 40-50 lakhs per year for Front organizations

Types of front Organizations

Broadly speaking, front organisations can be categorised into three types depending upon their nature and functions

- Underground Revolutionary Mass Organizations
- Open or semi-open Revolutionary Mass Organizations
- Mass organizations not directly linked to Party
- Fractional Work
- Cover organizations
- Legal democratic organizations

Open Front organizations & Party Cover organizations

- JNM :- Jana Natya mandaly
- RWA:- Revolutionary Writers Association
- AILRC:- All india league of revolutionary culture.
- CLC:- Civil Liberties Committee.
- HRF:- Human Rights Forum
- KNPS:- Kula Nirmulana Porata Samithi
- PDM:- Patriotic Democratic Movement
- PKM:- Praja Kala Mandaly
- CMS:- Chaitanya Mahila Samakhya
- ABMS:- Amarula Bandhu Mithrula Samgam.
- TJS:- Telangana Jana Sabha
- TSF:- Telangana students Front
- TPF:- Telangana Praja Front
- TIF:- Telangana Ikya Front
- AIV:- Adivasi Ikya Frount
- AVS :- Adivasi Vidyarthri Sangam
- BVPC:- Bharatiya Vidya Parirakshana Committee
- TIKC:- Telangana Ikya Karyacharana Committee
- AKASA:- RTC Karmika Samakya
- DTF:-Democratic Teachers Federation

Struggles taken up by Front Organizations

- Adivasi rights
- Podu Lands issue
- Distribution of lands
- 1/70 Act
- Against various Mining projects
- Displacements caused due to various Major/Minor Irrigation Projects.
- Hindu Fascism

Mass organizations & Secret revolutionary MOs

- Mass organizations are absolutely indispensable for the victory of revolution.
 - The principle aim of building mass organizations is to prepare and organize the masses for revolution.
 - Mass organization is a powerful weapon to convince the masses and instill confidence in them and mass struggle.
 - Without the mobilizations of mass organizations party cannot face the police action.
 - The strength of the Maoist party is mass base, it will develop only by mass organizations
- Strictly underground
 - Propagate the Party's revolutionary line among the masses rousing them for armed struggle.
 - Openly call upon the masses to participate in the people's war.
- Example:**
- Dandakarnya Adivasi Kisan Mazdur Sangh.
 - Krantikari Adivasi Mazdur Sangh.
 - Chitanya Natya Mandali

Banned organizations

- CPI(ML)PWG(1980) – Communist party of India (Marxist Leninist)- Peoples war Group
- RSU(1974)- Radical Student Union
- RYL(1978)- Radical Youth League
- AIRSF(1975)- All India revolutionary Students Federation
- SIKASA(1982)-Singareni Karmika Samakhya
- VIKASA(1981)-Viplava Karmika samakya
- APRCS(1981)-AP Rytu Cooli Sangam
- RDF (2012)- Revolutionary Democratic Front

Telangana Police Experience

Lessons Learnt

- Commitment of government.
- Continuity in government policies.
- Importance of multipronged approach.
- Need for tackling enemy – 360 degrees simultaneously.
- Neutralizing top leadership.
- Major role & ownership for the local state police.
- Limitations of para military forces.
- Technology as force multiplier.
- Transformation of local police forces 360 degrees.

Current Scenario in Telangana (after Union Govt's all out approach)

- Activity confined mostly in the border areas of Chhattisgarh.
- TG is free from extremist violence.
- The Govt. of Telangana is not sparing any effort in containing the activities of Left-Wing Extremists.

The Telangana Doctrine: 7 Lessons for Sustainable Peace

- 1. Unity of Command is Non-Negotiable:**
An integrated administration under a 'Single Umbrella' (ITDA) prevents gaps insurgents can exploit.
- 2. Saturation Defeats Insurgency:**
Piecemeal development fails. 100% saturation of schemes creates a **universal peace dividend that isolates extremists.**
- 3. Land Rights are the Bedrock: Resolving land claims (RoFR) is the most critical confidence-building measure, but must be followed by investment support to make land viable.**
- 4. Education is the Ultimate Counter-Insurgency:**
 - Quality residential schools (Gurukulams) inoculate the next generation against radical ideology.
- 5. Culture is a Bridge, Not a Barrier:**
Respecting and promoting tribal culture integrates communities into the mainstream without erasing identity.
- 6. Technology is a Force Multiplier:** Use technology to overcome the logistical and economic hurdles of the Red Corridor—from digital land records to drone medicine delivery.
- 7. Political Inclusion is the Final Lock:**
Decentralization and genuine local power (PESA) give people a stake in the system, making the gun irrelevant.

Telangana stands ready to share this blueprint, offering a proven model where the red of extremism is replaced by the green of prosperity and the tri-color of the national mainstream.

The Dividend: A Decisive Turnaround in the Security Landscape


Active LWE Cadre Strength



2014

2025

LWE-Affected Districts



Then: 8 (Severely Affected) | **Now:** 2 (Residual Pockets)

New Recruitment



Past: A constant threat. | **Recent Years:** Zero

This transformation is the direct result of a deliberate strategy of Peace Consolidation, not a temporary lull in violence.


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
2014 –(08)
Undivided dists



2026 -(03)



Active LWE Cadre Strength



New Recruitment

0

Past: A constant threat.
Recent Years: **Zero**

Thank you